State Dominance in Urban Redevelopment: Beyond Gentrification in Urban China by Wu, F
Urban Affairs Review
 1 –28
© The Author(s) 2015 
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav 
DOI: 10.1177/1078087415612930
uar.sagepub.com
Article
State Dominance in 
Urban Redevelopment: 
Beyond Gentrification in 
Urban China
Fulong Wu1
Abstract
This article will revisit Smith’s seminal argument that gentrification is a 
global urban strategy. The article pays attention to the role of the state and 
displacement during the process of redevelopment. Through an in-depth 
study of a dilapidated neighborhood with concentrated migrant population 
in Shanghai, it is revealed that state control is behind the deterioration 
of the neighborhood prior to its redevelopment. Inadequate services and 
poor housing conditions are undeniable. Informal development has been 
quickly realigned by state dominance. The self-building neighborhood is 
eventually replaced by state-sanctioned development projects. The article 
echoes the debate over displacement in the West and suggests that recent 
urban redevelopment in China has gone beyond both the sporadic middle-
class return to the city and residential changes backed up by state actions, 
revealing hegemonic power of the state over spatial production. Through 
urban redevelopment, the state attempts to regularize informal areas into 
new production spaces for its revenue maximization.
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Introduction
Urban redevelopment has been extensively studied under the notion of gentri-
fication (Lees, Slater, and Wyly 2008). The standard definition of gentrification 
describes the process as residential changes from a lower-income to middle-
class neighborhood without considering the change outside residential uses. 
Recent studies on gentrification expand the temporality and geographical con-
texts (Lees 2012) and include displacement and dispossession as part of gentri-
fication processes (Lees, Shin, and López-Morales 2015). This means that 
while market-driven pressures were responsible for much of the transition, the 
dynamics may involve state actions at various times and places. In other words, 
gentrification may not necessarily rely on the market. This expansion of scope 
is helpful to understand the exact meaning of gentrification in the Global South 
(Harris 2008) through a comparative perspective (Robinson 2011). Regarding 
the periodization of gentrification, Smith (2002) suggested that gentrification 
has changed from the sporadic, middle-class–led return to the city to a more 
private market-driven and state-facilitated growth model. He argued that gen-
trification is becoming a global urban strategy because gentrification “initially 
emerged as a sporadic, quaint, and local anomaly in the housing markets of 
some command-center cities, [and] is now thoroughly generalized as an urban 
strategy that takes over from liberal urban policy” (Smith 2002, p. 427). 
Developing further his revanchist urbanism, Smith (2002, p. 427) emphasized 
the role of the state in promoting gentrification, suggesting that
much as the neoliberal state becomes a consummate agent of—rather than a 
regulator of—the market, the new revanchist urbanism that replaces liberal 
urban policy in cities of the advanced capitalist world increasingly expresses 
the impulses of capitalist production rather than social reproduction.
The argument implies a possible change from residential to nonresidential 
uses. His argument contains fairly complex messages. He insisted that gentri-
fication was class-based and class-making. Although he associated the phe-
nomenon with neoliberalism, he did not dismiss the role of the state. On the 
contrary, he suggested the specific revanchist role of the state was seen in the 
process of gentrification. He emphasized the change from residential upgrad-
ing to other uses that have higher exchange values. He even speculated that 
such a phenomenon was becoming global, and was adopted intentionally as a 
“strategy.” With this statement, he significantly extended the concept of gen-
trification beyond spontaneous residential changes observed by Ruth Glass in 
the 1960s in London. Even though he still used the word “gentrification,” the 
substance of his concept includes residential changes that include displace-
ment as an essential feature.
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Recent studies on gentrification in the West further suggest the evolution 
of gentrification, which can be divided into different waves (Hackworth 
2002; Lees, Slater, and Wyly 2008; van Gent 2013). Gentrification, thus, 
should be viewed in the context of changing approaches to urban changes. 
Earlier urban renewal programs under the Keynesian welfare state have been 
criticized for their detrimental impact on inner city neighborhoods. In the 
United States, the demolition project initiated by the state was condemned as 
the “federal bulldozer” (Jacobs 1961). In the United Kingdom, large-scale 
social housing estates were regarded as a failure (Power 1993). Although 
there have been debates over whether a new wave of gentrification leads to 
social mixing in inner urban areas (Bridge, Butler, and Lees 2011; Butler 
2007), critical scholarship emphasizes displacement as an essential outcome 
of gentrification (Newman and Wyly 2006; Slater 2006; Smith 2002; 
Wacquant 2008; Watt 2008; Wyly et al. 2010). However, Lees (2008) sug-
gested that new policies of social mixing based on gentrification are not evi-
dence-based and may have more detrimental effects on the communities they 
are designed to help.
In the Global South, urban redevelopment is often associated with slum 
clearance policy (Gilbert 2007). But renewal programs are criticized for their 
one size fits all approach (Irazabal 2009), which tries to promote owner- 
occupied property rights. There is a significant degree of informality in the 
Global South (Roy 2005; Weinstein and Ren 2009; F. Wu, Zhang, and 
Webster 2013). Comparing gentrification in London and Mumbai, Harris 
(2008, p. 2423) pointed out that gentrification in Mumbai is due to “a power-
ful nexus of politicians, builders and developers exploiting and profiting 
from Mumbai’s poorly implemented and monitored land use policies and 
planning controls.” Therefore, redevelopment in Mumbai is not an outcome 
of the spread of gentrification to the Global South. Regarding Mumbai, Doshi 
(2013) argued that the perspective of accumulation by displacement would be 
more appropriate than gentrification because urban redevelopment and evic-
tion cause not only class-based displacement but also dispossession along 
gender and ethno-religious dimensions. Comparing Mumbai and Shanghai, 
Weinstein and Ren (2009) found an institutional difference in urban redevel-
opment. Large-scale renewal programs in Shanghai resulted in widespread 
residential displacement. But populist politics and electoral contests pro-
duced a “relatively more protective” regime for low-income houses 
(Weinstein and Ren 2009, p. 411). However, in both cases, urban renewal 
compromised the housing rights of the urban poor.
Just like the complex structure of property rights in the Global South (Doshi 
2013; Roy 2005), the property right system in China is far from a standard 
market economy. China operates on a divided urban and rural land-use system. 
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This proves to be a major obstacle to a market-centered process of gentrifica-
tion. The urban land is owned by the state but its use rights are sold in a com-
petitive land market, while the rural land is collectively owned by farmers who 
also have the use right of their housing plots. The transfer from rural land to 
urban land can only be made through state land acquisition. In a sense, the 
ownership of rural land, even when it is physically located inside the city due 
to urban expansion, is subject to the constraint of development rights, which 
means market-centered gentrification from rural to urban land is not possible. 
Within urban land, although it is possible in theory for higher-income residents 
to purchase properties in old urban areas and renovate them, practically this has 
to be achieved through large-scale urban redevelopment. Increasingly, the 
intervention of the state means that this process is combined with economic 
restructuring, leading to the conversion from residential to more profitable 
office and commercial uses.
China’s urban redevelopment provides an opportunity to reveal the role of 
the state and consequential displacement. Walker and Buck (2007) argued 
that China experienced a “neoliberal shift.” The change has led to a more 
market-oriented approach to urban redevelopment. He and Wu (2009) sug-
gested that urban redevelopment in China emerged in the forefront of neolib-
eralization and created neoliberal urbanism. However, they recognized that 
neoliberal governance was created by state rescaling, and, thus, the central 
and local states had different positions toward urban redevelopment, which 
actually created tensions between the central and local governments. The 
central government is more concerned about social stability, while local gov-
ernments, driven by the mechanism of land incentives, are more aggressive 
and entrepreneurial. Shin (2009) noted that Beijing as an entrepreneurial 
local state promoted urban redevelopment. In Shanghai, the Xintiandi rede-
velopment project was driven by private capital and the developer from Hong 
Kong to convert a low-end neighborhood into mixed-use upper-market hous-
ing (He and Wu 2005; Ren 2008; Yang and Chang 2007). Because of the criti-
cal role of the state, for example, in legitimizing a market-driven 
redevelopment approach to develop Shanghai as a global city, gentrification 
projects in China are arguably “state-sponsored” (He 2007). Although urban 
redevelopment improved housing conditions in central and inner urban areas, 
which is regarded as a positive change (S.-M. Li and Song 2009), urban 
demolition and land grabbing led to social conflict (He 2012; He et al. 2009; 
Hsing 2010; Shao 2012). Urban redevelopment occurred not only in inner 
urban neighborhoods but also in newly emerged informal settlements con-
verted from rural villages in peri-urban areas (He et al. 2009; Tian 2008). 
Urban redevelopment is a way to eliminate informality through state-initiated 
projects (F. Wu, Zhang, and Webster 2013). Given the significant role of the 
 at University College London on January 19, 2016uar.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Wu 5
state in redevelopment, the notion of “property-led regeneration” (He and Wu 
2005) becomes questionable.
Regarding the argument that gentrification is now being adopted as a 
global urban strategy (Smith 2002), this study draws an intensive case study 
of a dilapidated neighborhood in Shanghai, which was converted from a peri-
urban rural village and became a thriving place for rural migrants, and was 
demolished in early 2013. The study uses 16 semistructured interviews, span-
ning from May 2010 to June 2013. The initial 15 interviews were conducted 
in the period from May to August 2010, and 1 interview was made in June 
2013 in district planning office. Each one lasted 30 minutes to two hours, 
including a meeting with the cadres of the residents’ committee and focus 
group meetings with the local district planning office in conjunction with a 
taskforce organized by the Shanghai municipal planning bureau. Repeated 
visits were made in the following years, which allowed us to observe the 
demolition process from the beginning to the stage of near completion. 
Informal contacts with the neighborhood were attempted through using bar-
bershops and chatting with landlords when attempting to find rental rooms 
there. Interviewees included officers from the municipal planning bureau 
(two), planners from the design institute (four), district planning officers 
(two), cadres of residents’ committee (four), and landlords and renters (four). 
In addition, the project conducted a questionnaire survey of 100 resident 
families in Gaojiabang as part of a larger multicity survey (see Z. Li and Wu 
2013). Policy materials, including the district government work report and 
the policy for compensation in housing demolition and acquisition, were col-
lected. A quick scrutiny of the neighborhood conceptual plan was made in the 
government office, but we did not manage to retain a copy. We also organized 
two workshops in Shanghai which local planners and neighborhood cadres 
were asked to attend and present their viewpoints about neighborhood rede-
velopment. These workshops were intended to serve as focus group meet-
ings. The policy documents collected include the documents prepared by 
district planning offices for the Shanghai Municipal Planning Bureau’s task-
force for urban village redevelopment, the document for compensation stan-
dard in Gaojiabang and Qiaojiatang by the district planning office, and a 
training manual prepared by the Shanghai Municipal Planning Bureau for 
second industrial land investigation.
The purpose of this research, therefore, is to provide an in-depth study to 
address the role of the state in urban redevelopment and its consequential 
outcomes for Chinese cities. Although there are extensive neighborhood-
level studies, the intention here is not to discuss residential segregation and 
neighborhood changes but rather to trace and chronicle the development of 
neighborhoods to detect the historical conditions and the “logic” that leads to 
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demolition and redevelopment. The rest of the article is organized as follows. 
“The Stages of Urban Redevelopment in China” section reviews the stages of 
urban redevelopment in China. “Locating the Case of Urban Redevelopment 
in Shanghai” section provides the historical and geographical context of the 
case study. “The Dynamics of Urban Deterioration” section examines the 
reasons why the neighborhood entered an irreversible trajectory of deteriora-
tion. “The Process of Urban Redevelopment” section investigates the process 
of urban redevelopment. “State Dominance in Urban Redevelopment” sec-
tion examines state dominance in redevelopment processes. “Social 
Implications of State-Dominated Redevelopment” section provides a detailed 
account of the consequence of urban redevelopment. “Conclusion” section 
concludes the study.
The Stages of Urban Redevelopment in China
Chinese central and inner city areas became dilapidated after years of con-
strained “non-productive investment” in the built environment under state 
socialism (Leaf 1995). In the 1990s, redevelopment programs were launched 
to renovate and refurbish dilapidated housing. In Shanghai, a “365 urban 
renewal program” was initiated to renovate 3.65 million square meters of old 
lane housing. In Beijing, the initial redevelopment program was called “Old 
and Dilapidated Housing Redevelopment Program” (ODHRP) (Fang and 
Zhang 2003; Shin 2009). In Guangzhou, urban renewal in the 1990s was led 
by the municipal government in conjunction with infrastructure development 
(He 2012). These programs, though they introduced some market mecha-
nisms, progressed slowly because the housing and land markets were under-
developed until 1998, when the state initiated a more radical market 
reorientation of housing policy.
The new policies in the 2000s adopted a more market-oriented approach, 
introducing “property developers” into the renewal process. The new phase 
was referred to as “property-led redevelopment” (Turok 1992) by researchers 
on Chinese cities (He 2012; Shin 2009; Yang and Chang 2007), as the demo-
lition and redevelopment policy targeted deriving capital from property 
development to fund urban renewal projects. In Shanghai, for example, the 
changes were from on-site relocation to off-site relocation, from in-kind 
compensation to monetary compensation, and from a household size–based 
compensation method to a floor area–based compensation method, and the 
process of demolition and relocation has been gradually marketized. In short, 
urban redevelopment was facilitated by the “commodification” of housing 
and property rights redistribution (He et al. 2009; F. Wu, Xu, and Yeh 2007), 
as the redevelopment process favored property developers and neglected the 
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interests of affected residents. Because the work of demolition was contracted 
out to developers, there was a tendency to reduce the cost of compensation in 
demolition (F. Wu 2004), which triggered widespread contests over urban 
demolition (Hsing 2010). This resulted in tighter policies on demolition, 
which required the demolition work to be separated from actual property 
developers and undertaken by licensed specialized demolition companies on 
government contracts.
However, a new round of urban redevelopment has been promoted by the 
organization of mega-events, such as 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, 2010 
Shanghai World Expo, and 2010 Guangzhou Asian Games, in Chinese large 
metropolises (He 2012; Shin 2013; F. Wu, Zhang, and Webster 2013). This 
new round of urban redevelopment is driven by more intense intercity compe-
tition and place branding, economic restructuring, and the making of “global 
cities” (He 2012). The redevelopment, therefore, has a more ambitious aim 
than improving housing conditions and the extraction of land revenue (Tao 
et al. 2010), which is adopted as a means to promote economic restructuring, 
for example, by reducing the proportion of manufacturing industries and pro-
moting the tertiary sector and producer services. Redevelopment is seen as an 
approach to adjusting land uses in industrial development zones, and the 
removal of the remaining villages inside the city, which are known as “urban 
villages” (chengzhongcun). These are a special type of urban neighborhood 
produced by the unique institutions of residential household registration 
(hukou) and land ownership (Liu et al. 2010; F. Wu, Zhang, and Webster 
2013), and are in essence informal settlements with migrant population who 
do not have local registration status. The villagers own their housing plots 
(zhaijidi) but have lost their farmland. However, during land requisition, they 
may have retained some farmland to be used by the village as collective assets 
for the village economy (Tian 2008). These neighborhoods are characterized 
by unstable land rights and a mixture of rural and urban society (Liu et al. 
2010). In Beijing, a new round of village redevelopment was initiated in 2010 
to remove about 50 urban villages from the city. In Shanghai, land policies 
encourage the concentration of industrial development in parks, whereas for 
existing industrial parks, a second phase redevelopment has been initiated. In 
Guangdong province, a new renewal policy known as sanjiu gaizao is targeted 
at redeveloping old urban areas, old factories, and old villages. Property devel-
opment remains an interest for the government, but the objective is now 
broadened to target increasing the size of gross domestic product (GDP) and 
promoting high value-added economies. The “hidden” agenda behind urban 
redevelopment is to make room for economic development under the tight-
ened land policy which currently restrains local governments’ acquisition of 
farmland in rural areas through centrally allocated land quotas. Redeveloped 
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village and factory lands are outside the land development quota and, hence, 
can be recycled to accommodate new uses.
Table 1 presents a simplified periodization of urban redevelopment in 
China. It should be noted that the shift of policy focus has been more gradual 
in some cities and interest in property remains a central objective rather than 
having been replaced by the tertiary economy. The periodization is punctuated 
by major historical conditions and events such as joining the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the 2008 global financial crisis. Policy aims have 
shifted from being more focused on housing, to property-related upscale hous-
ing, and, finally, to the economic sphere, in an interesting parallel to what 
Smith (2002) called the change from social reproduction to global production 
strategy. Although the state has always been prominent in redevelopment, we 
have seen changes from state workplace capital mobilization to real estate 
capital, and to more state-backed or state-owned development corporations in 
making space for growth. The outcome is expanded from renewed estates and 
peri-urban housing estates for relocated households to newly developed sub-
urban upscale commodity housing and to mixed-use complexes featured by 
superblocks in the city. In contrast to the earlier diversity under so-called 
“property-led redevelopment,” we now see more production centers, declin-
ing population in central areas, and the re-economizing of central areas as 
places for production and distribution. Urban redevelopment led not only to 
the relocation of original households but also to the relocation of rural 
migrants. Neighborhoods with concentrations of rural migrants are disappear-
ing after demolition and returning to green space and new office space for the 
new global city. Ironically, to pacify conflict over relocation, the policy has 
become more flexible in terms of location choice and more generous in com-
pensation to property owners. This urban redevelopment is creating a new 
“housing class,” which owns multiple properties from which the owners enjoy 
asset appreciation and rental incomes. Throughout, displacement is a promi-
nent feature (He 2012; Shin 2009), but now there is a subtle difference. In 
places with migrant tenants, many original owners have already moved out, so 
urban demolition has had less impact on them. In contrast, migrant tenants are 
not able to claim compensation and, thus, are displaced without exception.
Locating the Case of Urban Redevelopment in 
Shanghai
In this study, a dilapidated but thriving neighborhood located in one of four 
central districts, Xuhui district in Shanghai, was chosen for the case study 
(Figure 1). The neighborhood is fairly representative in the sense that it is just 
one of many neighborhoods informally developed. The case shows some 
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difference between Shanghai and other cities in Southern China. But it reveals 
some essential features of state dominance, with varying degrees. Although 
the case is slightly more complicated owing to its history of development and 
bankruptcy of state-owned enterprises, the experience of this neighborhood 
can be generalized into the understanding of other neighborhoods in China 
because it represents a new trend of neighborhood changes and land develop-
ment during economic restructuring. The neighborhood shared similarities 
with other inner urban dilapidated areas (He and Wu 2005, 2009). But this 
neighborhood is more representative as the location of this neighborhood is in 
the peri-urban area but not in the suburbs, which are a long distance from the 
city center. It is also a migrant neighborhood, which is quite well known to 
Xuhui district and local media. Another reason to choose this neighborhood is 
because the Shanghai government has adopted a new redevelopment strategy 
since 2010 to target these remaining informal neighborhoods. In the 1980s, 
this neighborhood was at the peri-urban area or literally the boundary of the 
urban built-up area. Now, the place has become a mature urban area and is 
surrounded by well-developed urban streets. The main entrance is at Caobao 
Road and is very small and hidden away from the attention of pedestrians on 
the main road. Inside the gate is a densely populated residential area with 
many small shops, restaurants, and stores. According to the local officer, there 
were about 3,000 migrant tenants, and the registered urban population (exclud-
ing migrants) was 1,373 people. But only 20% of this local registered popula-
tion still lived in the place; the rest have moved out to other places but still 
owned properties there (interview, a resident committee cadre, June 2010).
Figure 1. The location of Gaojiabang and sites of relocated housing projects.
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In terms of size, Gaojiabang occupies about 4 hectares (about 60 mu, 15 
mu = 1 hectare) of land and is adjacent to another dilapidated neighborhood 
called Qiaojiatang (interview, a member of residents’ committee, June 2010). 
The two areas are literally indistinguishable, with a total area of 100 mu of 
underdeveloped urban villages in this area. The block is defined by Caobao 
Road, Tianlin Road, Guilin Road, and Cangwu Road. There are several fac-
tories nearby, some derelict. Before the 1980s, Gaojiabang village was at the 
edge of Shanghai. Initially, some of the agricultural land of the village was 
acquired by the Shanghai Electronic Meters Factory. In 1980, Shanghai 
Jinxin TV Factory received approval from the government to develop a joint 
production line with a Japanese investor and, thus, acquired the remaining 60 
mu of land from the village. In return, the factory recruited 99 rural laborers. 
In 1984, the second phase of construction absorbed 20 more rural laborers. 
But in 1992, the color television industry in Shanghai began to experience 
difficulties because of increasing competition from other production lines in 
Fujian province and Beijing. Eventually, the factory went bankrupt, and in 
2002, it was sold to Shanghai Broadcast and Television Corporation (SBTC). 
The remaining 40 mu of agricultural land were finally acquired by SBTC’s 
television research institute project.
Gaojiabang was also at the boundary between urban and rural jurisdic-
tions, and, hence, suffered from complicated administrative changes. In 1997, 
the agricultural production team of Gaojiabang was temporarily under the 
jurisdiction of Hongmei town of the suburban district of Minhang (not the 
current Xuhui district). In 2002, the town was converted into an urban admin-
istrative unit of “subdistrict office” (jiedao), while the production unit of 
Gaojiabang remained as a rural administrative unit within the subdistrict. 
About half of the rural laborers were absorbed by industrial development 
according to the regulation of the time, that is, two rural laborers were enti-
tled to be recruited for every 1 mu of land acquired (interview, “street offi-
cer,” June 2010). During this temporary management (tuoguan) under the 
suburban town, the control of housing reconstruction was relatively lax, 
because Gaojiabang was situated at the border of urban and suburban districts 
and experienced a management vacuum. The expansion of farmers’ housing 
plots was approved, and building permits were issued by the town, which laid 
down the initial base of the subsequent rental economy.
In the 1980s and 1990s, some farmers sold their houses to employees of 
small enterprises in Shanghai, including factories, such as Shanghai Carpet 
Factory, Shanghai Plant of Electric Resistance, and Shanghai Panel Plant, 
which could not provide enterprise housing to their employees. As a result, the 
composition of landlords in the area is more complicated than in a typical 
migrant village because, in this case, urban households also live there. This also 
created an odd situation in which urban residents owned “private housing” on 
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top of collective land ownership. This also created difficulties for later demoli-
tion compensation because for urban residents who do not own land, the gov-
ernment compensates only the construction cost of the housing rather than the 
whole package of land acquisition. After 2002, the process of the bankruptcy of 
state industries speeded up, and workers were laid off. The rural laborers who 
had been recruited into the enterprises suffered most and returned to Gaojiabang. 
Around that time, the Caohejin Economic and Technological Development 
Zone (ETDZ) was set up and a large new supermarket was opened, which 
recruited about 1,000 workers (interview, June 2010). The demand for private 
rental housing increased because of the opening of the new supermarket, and 
many Gaojiabang residents began to subdivide their spare space and rent out 
rooms. In their experience, the smaller and, hence, cheaper the space was, the 
more popular with tenants (interview, a landlord, August 2010).
After the bankruptcy of the enterprises, the acquired farmland was under 
the trust of Caohejin ETDZ (nicknamed “Cao developer”). The “Cao devel-
oper,” however, is not a level of government. It is a development corporation. 
Compared with other development zones, the Cao developer operated in a 
more “entrepreneurial” way than other quasi-government organizations that 
were managed by the development management committee, guanweihui. 
Because of this quasi-public corporative nature, its development approach is 
incremental, that is, it does not develop land in large quantities. Rather than 
acquiring the whole area to develop, it usually acquires part of the area and 
starts development through phases. The Cao developer has never managed to 
acquire the whole site of the village, although the former agricultural land 
acquired by the state industrial development was transferred to its control. 
The village area, thus, remained and experienced spontaneous densification 
over the years. Along with the development of the nearby area and increasing 
demand for rental space, while large-scale redevelopment was prohibited by 
the complexity of property rights and self-building was restricted by the 
stronger planning control in Shanghai, private rental housing was further sub-
divided into smaller units with deteriorating housing conditions. More spe-
cifically, the Cao developer lacked the capacity to acquire the village because 
of the high cost of compensation under an increasing population density, 
while other developers would not have found the redevelopment of the 
remaining residential part profitable without acquiring the adjacent sites of 
factories.
Through exploring the specificity of the temporality and geographic con-
text of Gaojiabang, the trajectory of neighborhood change toward an infor-
mal rental place is much more understandable. The neighborhood, like other 
urban villages, became undevelopable due to both the restriction on informal 
building and formal development. This actually meant that only the state 
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would be able to initiate redevelopment projects, because incremental gentri-
fication was extremely difficult. Although the obstacles prohibiting gentrifi-
cation in Gaojiabang are fairly specific to the case, these issues are by no 
means unique in the neighborhood. The division between formal state- 
sanctioned urban land and informal collectively owned rural land is a com-
mon feature of Chinese land-use system. The system prohibits the transaction 
of rural land into urban uses without the state formal permission, which lays 
down the mechanism that formalization rather than gentrification is a major 
process of urbanization. The process of formalization means that the state is 
a key driver of the process, resembling the role of a “consummate agent” of 
the market (Smith 2002), which has been neglected in neoliberal market 
economies.
The Dynamics of Urban Deterioration
Gaojiabang has not experienced much spontaneous redevelopment. The scale 
of this rental economy is still modest. Average housing space was 150 square 
meters, typically as two floors and a “half” floor (for storage) with a site 
space of 28 square meters, plus 30 to 40 square meters of front and back gar-
den for raising chickens and ducks (interview, former production team leader, 
June 2010). The space normally generates a rental income of 5,000 to 6,000 
Yuan per month; for those who have extra space and a good location, this 
could be as high as 20,000 Yuan per month. There are several reasons, attrib-
utable to the deterioration of the living environment and the lack of spontane-
ous redevelopment. First, the lack of redevelopment is due to the strong 
capacity of local governance to implement development control. Shanghai 
operates relatively strict planning controls. The redevelopment of village 
housing requires the approval of a local planning office. Illegal construction 
is stopped and demolished (interview, a district planner, September 2010). It 
was reported by the director of Xuhui District government that in 2012, the 
district evicted illegal buildings of 55,000 square meters (Government Work 
Report in District Peoples’ Congress, January 9, 2013).
Second, during land acquisition, the village governance structure was dis-
mantled, because the collectively owned farmland became state owned. 
Although villagers still owned their residential plots (zhaijidi), the land was 
de facto privately occupied (as housing sites) and there was no collective 
asset under the control of the neighborhood; hence, it was impossible to 
develop large-scale collective economies (e.g., to rent out premises to facto-
ries and warehouses). In general, even before land acquisition, farmers in the 
rural areas of Shanghai were less organized into traditional family and clan 
structures. This is quite different from villages in Southern China, which 
 at University College London on January 19, 2016uar.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
14 Urban Affairs Review 
often have very strong family and clan organizations (Tian 2008; Zhao and 
Webster 2011). Rather, in Shanghai and nearby Southern Jiangsu, the collec-
tive economy was based on the village cadres who led the “agricultural pro-
duction team” rather than the clan head. The former were often more easily 
absorbed into the process of state industrialization and became state employ-
ees. And indeed this was the case. In the land acquisition process, because 
state employment was regarded as advantageous, it was therefore taken first 
by village cadres who changed their status. The result was the dismantling of 
rural society and, hence, a lack of local collective bargaining power or resis-
tance to land acquisition.
Third, the land titles of nearby areas are no longer held by the village, 
although sitting households still hold de facto ownership of their housing 
plots. This is different from the practice of “retained collective land” in 
Southern China (Tian 2008), which expands village collective assets to form 
a larger rental economy. This pragmatic practice in Southern China has 
expanded village capacity even after land acquisition. That is, thanks to this 
additional resource, urban villages in Southern China maintain their collec-
tive capacities (Zhao and Webster 2011). In contrast, Gaojiabang had been 
“urbanized” prior to redevelopment and does not have collective land assets 
for extra income.
Fourth, the quality of the buildings in Gaojiabang is low, built using coal 
cinder bricks in the early 1980s. It is, thus, physically impossible to extend 
the buildings to four or five floors as in other cities in Southern China, and 
many old buildings are now deteriorating into dilapidated housing. This 
physical limitation constrained the development of large-scale rental econ-
omy of the neighborhood. As a result, the ratio of migrant population to local 
is rather modest; the migrant population is only three times the registered 
local population. This is quite different from the predominant migrant popu-
lation in Beijing and Guangzhou. Compared with the latter, the condition of 
rental housing is extremely appalling.
Fifth, the place has a long history of been threatened by imminent rede-
velopment, because SBTC and other developers started feasibility investi-
gations long ago, although eventually no development happened. There 
were rumors that the place would soon be evicted and redeveloped. All 
these rumors damaged the confidence of local households to renovate their 
properties. Although rental income is handsome, expectations from rede-
velopment compensation are more attractive, and as a result, local land-
lords generally look forward to redevelopment opportunities rather than 
investing in and expanding the rental economy. This explains why this area 
deteriorated. Because of limited rental housing, landlords generally wel-
come redevelopment.
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In sum, the deterioration of physical conditions and the lack of collective 
resources of this migrant neighborhood paved the way for large-scale rede-
velopment by the state. The deterioration before redevelopment is similar to 
the depressed rent and neighborhood decline as a prelude to gentrification in 
Western market economies (Smith 2002).
The Process of Urban Redevelopment
The redevelopment plan of Gaojiabang started in 2007. On September 30, 
2007, Shanghai Xuhui District Bureau of Housing and Land Management 
issued a permit for housing demolition to a state-owned enterprise that spe-
cializes in urban demolition, Guangqi Demolition and Relocation Ltd, to 
carry out the demolition work for Gaojiabang and adjacent Qiaojiatang. The 
permit was valid for one year. However, the work was not completed as 
planned. The permit was then renewed for another year to the end of 
September 2009. When the initial fieldwork was conducted in May 2010, the 
demolition work had not started. The cost of demolition was a heavy burden 
under the current policy in Shanghai. In 2011, the district government again 
proposed the redevelopment project along with other urban renewal projects 
for the “second-class alleyways” in the 12th Five-Year Plan, and allocated 2 
billion Yuan of public funds to its redevelopment. As planned, the land of 
Gaojiabang would be acquired after demolition and returned to the assets of 
the Land Development Center of Xuhui District for land banking. There was 
no immediate plan to release it to the land auction market. In fact, the plan 
was for the district government to demolish the neighborhood using public 
funds and generate a vacant space together with the adjacent derelict factories 
to create sites for service economies.
Compensation can be either monetary or an “ownership swap” (chanquan 
tiaohuan), that is, the government acquires the ownership of housing at 
Gaojiabang while the owners receive the compensation of housing at a differ-
ent location. The compensation is calculated according to the following for-
mula: The amount of compensation = (The reconstruction cost of the house 
per square meter + The baseline land premium at the demolition area + Price 
subsidy per square meter) × Housing construction floor space (interview, a 
district planner, June 2013). It is specified by the Xuhui district government 
that in this area, the baseline land premium is 5,900 Yuan per square meter, 
and the price subsidy is 1,770 Yuan per square meter. Because the housing 
condition of Gaojiabang is quite poor, the cost of reconstruction is generally 
low.
To facilitate rehousing, the district government prepares rehousing proj-
ects at different locations (see Figure 1 for the location of these rehousing 
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estates). Here, a simple calculation is used to show how difficult it would be 
to purchase rehousing in the same area. For example, assuming the recon-
struction cost of demolished housing was 2,500 Yuan per square meter, and 
the demolished house was generally small at 120 square meters, the total cost 
of compensation would be 10,170 Yuan per square meter (interview, a district 
planner, June 2013). According to the information listed by the real estate 
agents in the district, the market price for nearby rehousing is 16,000 Yuan 
per square meter (the price is lower than properties in the housing market 
because rehousing projects are only for relocated households at a discount 
price). This means the same house would have to be scaled down to 76 square 
meters. However, for owners to rent properties, it would be preferable to have 
more housing space in cheaper locations. Still, the provision of rehousing 
means a greatly discounted price (interview, a district planner, June 2013) 
because the average sale price in the housing market of secondary commod-
ity housing in Xuhui district is 36,946 Yuan per square meter while in the 
similar location of Tianlin, the market price reaches 29,978 Yuan per square 
meter (this was estimated through the Shanghai real estate evaluation net-
work). In fact, without the rehousing project, the residents of Gaojiabang 
would be unable to afford any housing in a nearby location, because the com-
pensation and purchase prices differ by three times.
It is interesting at this point to compare Gaojiabang with the redevelop-
ment of villages in other cities. The local governments of Chinese cities are 
keen to redevelop unplanned neighborhoods (Shin 2009; F. Wu, Zhang, and 
Webster 2013). The official discourse presents urban redevelopment as a pro-
gressive project to “modernize” the city (Zhang 2006). However, there are 
different motivations in various cities and situations. The reasons for promot-
ing urban redevelopment could include the following: to create a better image 
of the city, to demonstrate progress and “achievement in office,” to generate 
land revenue through real estate development, to use vacant space for other 
more economically profitable uses such as creative industries and commer-
cial uses, and, finally, to facilitate economic restructuring. In Beijing, the 
village of Tangjialing was demolished because the place was known for con-
centration of the “ant tribe,” referring to new university graduates or nonlocal 
population who had difficulty buying houses and, thus, lived in rental apart-
ments (F. Wu, Zhang, and Webster 2013). For Gaojiabang, the motivation for 
redevelopment was the latter. Other “scrape lands” constrained by limited 
size or in awkward locations could be demolished and converted into public 
green space, affordable housing projects, or educational and science uses 
(Wang, Lin, and Ning 2013). The district government presented this kind of 
noncommercial development as a new way to use public finance to improve 
the living conditions of (urban) residents (interview, a district planner, June 
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2013). Therefore, redevelopment goes beyond short-term land income during 
property-led redevelopment.
State Dominance in Urban Redevelopment
The role of the Chinese state in economic development is widely noted. For 
example, the government of Shanghai has played a significant role in devel-
oping the city toward being a global city. This article focuses on the role of 
the state in urban redevelopment, especially transforming informal urban vil-
lages into industrial and office uses during economic restructuring. More spe-
cifically, this section develops two related arguments: Stringent control over 
housing extension has led to housing deterioration, and the “right to the city” 
(Shin 2013; Slater 2006) is constrained and based on property ownership, 
which has made it possible for the state to maintain its dominance. The first 
argument reflects the consequences of state dominance in urban redevelop-
ment, whereas the second reflects the nature of using the market in the inter-
est of state power. By demonstrating the prominent role of the state in the 
formation, demolition, and creation of new urban spaces, the article engages 
with the premises of gentrification research about neoliberal urbanism and 
urban redevelopment in the Global South as a way to remove informality (F. 
Wu, Zhang, and Webster 2013).
Stringent Control Leading to Housing Deterioration
Although neighborhoods of rental housing for migrants are usually described 
as dilapidated, poor, and chaotic, housing conditions in migrant enclaves vary 
from city to city. Homeowners may not live in these neighborhoods, espe-
cially when conditions are really poor. Very often housing space has been 
extended to gain extra space for rental or subdivided further into smaller units 
without a formal approval plan. This informal feature of house building 
means that tenure may be insecure because the housing may be subject to 
demolition. Although, when compared with “commodity housing” developed 
through the real estate market, housing in old urban areas and migrant-con-
centrated villages has quite low quality, conditions in Shanghai are much 
worse than in Guangzhou (He 2012; Z. Li and Wu 2013; F. Wu, Zhang, and 
Webster 2013) or Beijing (Shin 2009; S. Zheng et al. 2009). In general, vil-
lage housing units are much smaller. S. Zheng et al. (2009) found that the 
average living space in urban villages in Beijing was 8 square meters per 
capita, much lower than the average of 27 square meters in the whole city of 
Beijing. In a recent survey of Shanghai (Wang, Lin, and Ning 2013), the aver-
age per capita housing space in Shanghai’s urban villages was 7.9 square 
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meters, far below the average of 17.5 square meters in Shanghai 2010 
(Shanghai Statistical Bureau 2011).
For Guangzhou and other cities in the Pearl River Delta, and to a lesser 
extent Beijing, self-built housing on village land is more tolerated (Hsing 
2010), resulting in the evolution of the village housing market to suit differ-
ent demands for rental housing. In Guangzhou, low-income young graduates 
may live in urban villages as their stepping stone or initial step on the housing 
ladder. In Beijing, large private housing compounds are developed to accom-
modate “white-collar” workers, as these are often called “white-collar apart-
ments” (bailin gongyu), and some may even have security swipe-cards to 
provide a good secure living environment. Ironically, more stringent control 
over self-extension and intolerance toward left-over villages in Shanghai do 
not lead to a better living environment but rather to poorer housing conditions 
because there is a lack of space for migrants, resulting in the subdivision of 
housing units rather than extended rooms or purpose-built housing. As for 
landlords, they want to maximize rental income but are constrained by rede-
velopment restrictions, so they are reluctant to invest in the improvement of 
housing quality and tend to subdivide housing into smaller rooms. According 
to the landlords interviewed (interview, August 2010), smaller units (for rent 
in the range of 400–500 Yuan per room) are usually easier to rent. This is 
partially due to the low affordability of migrant tenants and their strong pref-
erence to save on housing costs (W. Wu 2002). S. Zheng et al. (2009, p. 425) 
observed that migrants’ small space consumption “is a function not only of 
low income but also of a reluctance to spend their earnings in the city,” and 
that “migrant workers consider the city as a place to work rather than a home 
in which to live.” Because of the constraint of informal housing supply, the 
rent per square meter in Shanghai is the highest among the three cities. As a 
survival strategy, rural migrants respond to higher rents by reducing their 
space requirements and choosing smaller units in Shanghai.
The “Right to the City” Based on Property Ownership
Gaojiabang is not a squatter area, and, hence, its homeowners have legal 
property ownership of the housing in the neighborhood. Rural migrants can-
not squat in this place through self-building and have to pay rent for small 
and subdivided rooms in a house. Rights are, therefore, well defined on the 
basis of property ownership. There is no ambiguity over who owns individual 
houses and properties. Property rights, however, are constrained by the 
Chinese land management system, which divides urban and rural lands (Zhu 
2013). Although individual properties may have a certificate of ownership 
under rural housing, they are not allowed to be transacted in the secondary 
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urban housing market because they were built upon rural land rather than 
state-sanctioned land with a land deed. The endorsement of development, 
thus, represents state power in urban redevelopment. The ownership of hous-
ing is recognized and compensated during housing demolition. But tenancy 
is not subject to compensation in demolition.
Shanghai demolished and compensated thoroughly in the initial process of 
land acquisition, and, hence, original residents had far fewer remaining prop-
erties for claiming additional rights for their uses. In other places, however, 
housing extension is allowed by the state as compensation for the loss of 
agricultural land. In fact, there has been a standard practice in Guangdong 
province to “return” acquired agricultural land (which is in fact to return the 
development quota) to villagers to allow them to develop the land as “con-
struction land” (Tian 2008). This so-called “economic retained land” (jingji 
fanhuan yongdi) laid the foundation for the housing rental economy in 
Southern China as well as village-owned collective enterprises, and is in 
essence in-kind compensation of “development rights” to villagers for the 
land they owned.
In all rural areas, land for housing has been allocated according to family 
size. On these allocated housing plots (known as zhaijidi), villagers are 
allowed to build their houses but usually within a space limit (Tian 2008; Zhu 
2013). The tenure of this housing space is generally “secured,” and there is no 
ambiguity over ownership. But since the 1980s, many places have stopped 
allocating land for housing because of the shortage of agricultural land. Along 
with growing family members, marriage, and the arrival of new generations, 
housing demand is increasing. The government has had to allow villagers to 
build more housing space through self-extension to meet their housing needs. 
But in reality, farmers built far more space than was legally allowed to gain 
more rent. For assigned housing plots, villagers strove to develop as much as 
possible, up to the boundary of their plots. Some even managed to extend into 
the space upward over the street. This practice in Southern China was almost 
unseen in Shanghai. Shanghai has controlled not only self-building more 
tightly but also the overall size of rebuilding under specified limits. Any extra 
space above the limit is regarded as illegal and is subject to demolition. For 
this extra space, there is a certain degree of insecurity. But more insecurity 
comes from tenancy in rented properties, because the tenancy is not counted 
in the processes of demolition and redevelopment (Chung 2013). Although 
Chinese rural migrants are attracted by the development of globalizing 
Shanghai and allowed to be physically present in underdeveloped villages, 
such as Gaojiabang, their influence over the course of urban redevelopment is 
entirely absent due to the lack of property ownership. Chung (2013) revealed 
the relatively more advantageous position of local villagers compared with 
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rural migrants and their negotiation with the state for their right to the city. 
Such a situation of negotiation is absent in more dilapidated places in Shanghai 
where the right to the city is defined in the clearer terms of property rights. 
However, villagers and migrants are not necessarily antagonistic to each other; 
as Shin (2013) showed, a cross-class alliance may be able to go beyond prop-
erty rights activism.
Social Implications of State-Dominated 
Redevelopment
The informal neighborhood has been transformed by large-scale urban rede-
velopment. Irregularly shaped, organically developed, and informally built 
spaces are quickly replaced by modern high-rises. The process of redevelop-
ment follows the principle of “modernization” (Zhang 2006), aiming to cre-
ate a more orderly built environment. The formation of urban villages reflects 
the absence of state social provision to rural migrants (He 2012; He and Wu 
2009; Zhu 2013), similar to “non-intervention” in the West (van Gent 2013) 
(hence, “neoliberal”). However, the state maintains tough regulations in its 
control over the right of redevelopment. As predicted by Smith (2002), in 
contrast to the neoliberal approach in social reproduction, the state dominates 
in the process of redevelopment for globally oriented production.
In Gaojiabang, the development corporation controlled the adjacent dere-
lict factory land as state assets, while the residential area was under private 
rental housing. The local state now uses its public funds to acquire the land 
outside its control; later the land will be handed over to the development cor-
poration. Interestingly, the land is not released to the land auction market, as 
the strategy is to maximize future tax rather than land income. Despite differ-
ent motivations, urban redevelopment has recently speeded up in Chinese cit-
ies. Redevelopment projects now go beyond the simple urban renewal and 
renovation of dilapidated housing but rather have wider objectives of urban 
regeneration. All have eliminated the habitat of migrants and poor tenants (He 
2012; Shin 2009; F. Wu, Zhang, and Webster 2013). When we talked to a 
migrant tenant in the residual Gaojiabang, who is moving about (a brief con-
versation in front of rental housing, April 2013) with her corenters, she said,
We have to go. This place is convenient, but we only lived here temporarily. In 
fact, I worked in a factory in the suburbs before, and quit to come here for a better 
wage nearby. It’s lovelier here—inside the city. But I have to go back outside now. 
Maybe I could still ride my bike [to come to the city] but am not sure whether I 
could do this, as it’s a long way. Everything in Shanghai is changing so rapidly for 
us—we just don’t know where we will be tomorrow. (emphasis added)
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In contrast to the creation of superficial diversity, mock heritages, tradi-
tional housing styles, iconic buildings, and culture, leisure, and recreation 
activities through redevelopment (He and Wu 2005; Ren 2008; Yang and 
Chang 2007; J. Zheng 2011), the development of “ordinary” neighborhoods 
outside the global urban cores (Robinson 2006), such as Gaojiabang, shows 
the attempt to eliminate informal settlements to impose a formal spatial order 
(F. Wu, Zhang, and Webster 2013). This has been achieved through more 
formal urban redevelopment processes, which seized informal rental rights 
and converted them into state properties.
Displacement has a severe impact on rural migrants. They are attracted to 
the city because of the development of the globally connected economy, but 
at the same time, they are also excluded from the city because they do not 
manage to gain the “right to the city”; they are treated purely as a labor force 
and lack influence over the course of urban development and redevelopment. 
Their living space is the most vulnerable, compared with industrial working-
class communities (Slater 2006; Wyly et al. 2010). For rural migrants, their 
future faces some uncertainty after urban demolition. The first possibility 
might be to return to the countryside, as the cost of living in the globalizing 
metropolis is rising and exceeds their affordability. The second possibility 
might be relocation to other urban neighborhoods and gradual assimilation 
into urban life. This scenario might take a generation to complete its upward 
mobility. Informal neighborhoods disappeared due to urban demolition. The 
third possibility might be relocating to another urban village in a further away 
place. They would be connected with the urban economy but their residential 
forms would remain segregated. These possibilities depend upon the pace of 
urban redevelopment as well as on the degree of tolerance toward migrants’ 
neighborhoods. Migrant tenants might experience all these transient possi-
bilities. In this study, the creation, disappearance, and transience of urbanism 
are discussed in the process of urban redevelopment in Shanghai. Shanghai’s 
case is not unique, as demolition and displacement have been constant themes 
across Chinese urbanization in many cities. In the early 1990s, Zhang (2001) 
described the demolition of Zhejiangcun in Beijing. Urban demolition has 
become widespread since then in many other cities (He 2012; Shao 2012; 
Shin 2013; F. Wu, Zhang, and Webster 2013).
Conclusion
Gaojiabang represents an intriguing case of urban redevelopment in Shanghai. 
Although the case has its specific historical and geographical contexts, it rep-
resents a new trend of urban redevelopment in China. It reveals the second 
shift to foster economic restructuring through developing informal low-end 
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neighborhoods in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008. Studies 
of urban redevelopment in China extensively documented the first shift from 
the renewal of dilapidated neighborhoods to property-led development in the 
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis (He 2007, 2012; He and Wu 2005, 
2009; Shin 2009; Yang and Chang 2007; J. Zheng 2011). These redevelop-
ments were driven by property projects that aimed to generate land revenues 
for the local government (He and Wu 2009; Hsing 2010; Shin 2009; Tao et al. 
2010; Zhu 2013). They share some similarities with gentrification because of 
housing upgrading for the new rich and the creative and middle classes (He 
2012; He and Wu 2009; J. Zheng 2011). Although revenue generation is still 
a policy objective, the new development objective shown by this case empha-
sizes new high value-added economies and production (see Table 1), which 
echoes Smith’s (2002, p. 427) prediction of “a global urban strategy” that 
focuses on “capitalist production rather than social reproduction.” The notion 
of “beyond gentrification” here has a double meaning: First, it is beyond the 
sporadic market-based residential changes. The concept of gentrification has 
been extended recently to include a stronger role of nonmarket forces (Lees, 
Shin, and López-Morales 2015). Second, not to deny that residential upgrad-
ing, including “new built gentrification,” is still occurring in China, the domi-
nant trend is the land-use and ownership conversions from informal and 
low-income settlements to state supported industrial or commercial develop-
ment projects, that is, a shift from consumption to production as predicted by 
Smith.
The redevelopment of this migrant neighborhood represents an essential 
dimension of urban transformation beyond gentrification. This transition is 
quite representative in Shanghai in a period of economic restructuring and 
may indicate the trend in other Chinese cities in the future (He 2012; F. Wu, 
Zhang, and Webster 2013). The neighborhood was inhabited mostly by rural 
migrants who did not work in industry. They worked in informal and low-end 
services as shop assistants, cleaners, waitresses, security guards and porters 
for warehouses, and small workshop trainees. There was a sense of commu-
nity because these tenants could identify themselves with the place. Local 
governance is dominated by the state with a consolidated residents’ commit-
tee in the neighborhood. The redevelopment of Gaojiabang can hardly be 
described as a process of gentrification (Lees 2012; Lees, Slater, and Wyly 
2008), because there are no middle-class newcomers to replace the existing 
residents (Bridge, Butler, and Lees 2011; Watt 2008), and the redeveloped 
plots do not have any residential use. The redevelopment, thus, triggers a 
process of land-use conversion from residential to office and industrial uses.
Rather than gentrification, the dominant process of urban restructuring is 
the formalization of informal settlements in Chinese cities (F. Wu, Zhang, 
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and Webster 2013). Gaojiabang was once a thriving neighborhood with many 
small restaurants, street markets, small groceries, and barbershops; the place 
saw densification along with the arrival of migrant tenants. But the neighbor-
hood suffocated from a lack of investment in services and infrastructure. The 
living conditions of this migrant neighborhood were far from satisfactory. 
The place did not provide basic facilities, such as sewage discharge and toi-
lets within apartments, and was threatened by fire hazard because of wooden 
boards, narrow alleyways, and cluttered electric wires. The neglect by state 
policies is more often thought of as the cause of neighborhood decline. But in 
the case of informal neighborhoods in Chinese cities, it was due to state dom-
inance in urban development. Stringent control over self-building meant that 
landlords could not extend their buildings to accommodate migrant tenants, 
nor were they willing to improve services. They had to subdivide houses into 
smaller rooms to maximize rent before the eventual demolition. The control 
led to the increased subdivision of units, over-crowding, and eventual dete-
rioration of living conditions. The enforcement of controlling redevelopment 
rights prevents local residents from capturing the benefit of redevelopment. 
Although the regulation claims to control overdevelopment, the policy was 
not simply intended to be “development control” of land conversion but 
rather maintains the monopolistic position of the state in the urban land mar-
ket. The seeming beneficial policy of land-use regulation can be harmful to 
the poor like tough regulations shown in many policy analyses. The original 
village governance in this case was dismantled through recruiting village 
leaders into state-owned enterprises, leading to the absence of collective 
resistance toward urban redevelopment. The informal neighborhood was 
ephemeral and disappeared after redevelopment. In terms of landscape, the 
irregularly shaped streets were replaced by larger planned plots and super-
blocks defined by wider grid roads, as seen in other old neighborhoods under 
modernization (Zhang 2006). Informal private homeownership and private 
rental were replaced by state-sanctioned formal corporate-owned properties. 
Governance was further strengthened by conversion from the quasi-govern-
mental residents’ committee to large state development corporations.
The redevelopment of Gaojiabang, thus, reveals some important character-
istics of urban change in globalizing Shanghai: the dominance of the state and 
(state) capital over everyday urbanism during the course of postindustrial tran-
sition. To become a global city (Chen 2009), the (im-)migrant neighborhoods 
have been squeezed out to give space to service industries and new production 
activities such as research and development. To be globally competitive and 
economically efficient, the postindustrial development of Shanghai has been 
organized by the state and operated by state-backed corporations (e.g., state-
owned enterprises for demolition, the state land-banking center, and the 
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development corporations of industrial parks). In essence, Gaojiabang is not a 
housing improvement project, nor is it an image-making project. It is not even 
a profit-making real estate project of the type that is familiar to students of 
Chinese cities (He and Wu 2009), which may clear land and sell it in a land 
auction market for local land revenue (Tao et al. 2010). According to a district 
planning officer (interview, June 2013), “the redevelopment of Gaojiabang 
belongs to the secondary redevelopment of industrial parks (gongyeyuan erci 
gaizhao),” as the primary development refers to failed industrialization in the 
early years of the open door to global capital, in which factories were bank-
rupted under the impact of foreign investment. Gaojiabang, together with 
nearby derelict factories, was reclaimed by the local state to support the transi-
tion toward a postindustrial globalizing metropolis.
In his seminal discussion of gentrification in New York, Smith (2002, 
p. 427) suggested that “sporadic and quaint gentrification” under the liberal 
urban policy has been replaced by revanchist urbanism, which purposely uses 
gentrification as a global urban strategy. In doing so, he argued that the neolib-
eral state becomes a consummate agent of the market and that “investment of 
productive capital holds definitive precedence” (Smith 2002, p. 427). From an 
in-depth study of Shanghai’s informal neighborhood, this article confirms his 
prediction that a global urban strategy has indeed been used by the state to 
promote globalization and economic upgrading. Displacement is an essential 
outcome of this process. The new approach of redevelopment represents a 
phase departure from piecemeal developer-centered residential conversions 
(He and Wu 2005; Ren 2008; Yang and Chang 2007), which resembled prop-
erty-led redevelopment in the West (Turok 1992). However, spontaneous 
market-driven redevelopment activities have been realigned under state domi-
nance, because of public contests during enforced demolition and the impera-
tive of economic restructuring exceeding profit making in property 
developments. In the case of informal settlements, unregulated self-building 
by small landlords is soon replaced by state-sanctioned land projects, in a 
mega urban project approach. Thus, urban redevelopment may provide a valu-
able angle to better understand the nature of “neoliberal urbanism” in China 
(He and Wu 2009; Walker and Buck 2007). Regarding the role of the state, the 
term “neoliberal urbanism” (van Gent 2013) might be misleading as a way of 
characterizing a more liberal and market-centered approach. Although the 
state used the market mechanism in redevelopment, state dominance is a 
salient feature of urban redevelopment and requires rethinking as to whether 
the notion of “neoliberal urbanism” is appropriate in China (He and Wu 2009). 
Various actors are disguised as market agents, but they actually represent the 
state, for example, using public finance to secure bank loans (district govern-
ment), specializing in demolition and land clearance (state-owned company), 
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representing the landlord during redevelopment (land development center), 
and, finally, controlling the asset as part of an investment portfolio (develop-
ment corporation of the industrial park). Although Smith focused on the role 
of the state in revanchist and punitive policies, Chinese redevelopment is 
orchestrated by the state. Like significant differences observed in the Global 
South (Harris 2008; Lees 2012; Lees, Shin, and López-Morales 2015), what 
we see in Chinese urban redevelopment stretches the concept of gentrification. 
Gentrification in its classical sense is only one type of geography of urban 
redevelopment and residential transformation. Seeing Shanghai as a city 
within the world of cities (Robinson 2011), its state-dominated urban redevel-
opment may prompt us to rethink the term gentrification as having originated 
from specific economic and residential changes in the West (Wu forthcom-
ing). Although consequential expansion of the term includes capital reinvest-
ment in urban spaces, Chinese neighborhood changes show multiple facets of 
spatial transformation, including upgrading, conversion, and formalization.
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